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i 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 20000727-CA 
Priority No. 2 
GORDAN MASAGULUL PALELEI, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one 
count of Robbery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999), in the Third Judicial District 
Court, State of Utah, the Honorable L. A. Dever, Judge, 
presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) . See Addendum A (Judgment 
and Conviction). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court err in failing to suppress 
unreliable eyewitness identification evidence without making the 
requisite findings on the record and where the totality of the 
circumstances do not support the constitutional reliability of 
such evidence? 
Standard of Review: "'Whether a trial court is required to 
make findings of fact and legally determine the reliability of an 
eyewitness identification before admitting such testimony is a 
question of law" reviewed for correctness. State v. Nelson, 950 
P.2d 940, 942-43 (Utah App. 1997) (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 936 (Utah 1994)) . 
"'The constitutionality of an identification procedure 
presents a mixed question of fact and law.' On review, we give 
no deference to the trial court's determination that defendant's 
due process rights were not violated; however, we presume that 
the factual findings underlying that determination are correct." 
State v, Parra, 972 P.2d 924, 926-27 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting 
State v. Mincv, 838 P.2d 648, 657 (Utah App.1992)). 
II. Did the trial court err in giving a cautionary 
eyewitness identification instruction that did not adequately 
apprise the jury of the inherent weaknesses of such evidence? 
Standard of Review: "'Whether the trial court's refusal to 
give a proposed jury instruction constitutes error is a question 
of law, which we may review for correctness.' We review jury 
instructions in their entirety and will affirm when the 
instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the case." State v. Widdison, 2000 UT App 185, 
552, 397 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (quotations and citations omitted). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 4 
Appellant Gordan Masagulul Palelei's PPalelei") challenge 
to the constitutional reliability of the eyewitness 
identification evidence is preserved on the record for appeal 
PR.") at 14-28, 141. 




findings and conclusions of law as to the reliability of the 
eyewitness identification on the record is reviewable by this 
Court under the doctrine of plain error. Plain error occurs if: 
"(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to 
the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for [Palelei]." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 
1993) . 
In the present case, "an error exists," id., because, under 
this Court's opinion in State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940 (Utah App. 
1997), a trial court is required to make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law whenever it is presented with the issue of the 
constitutional admissibility of an eyewitness identification. 
Id. at 944-45 (citing Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c) (1997); State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991)). 
Moreover, "the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court," Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208, in light of Nelson. The trial 
court is charged with knowing the law of Utah, especially when it 
is made clear in an opinion by this Court. See State v. Kelsey, 
532 P.2d 1001, 1005 (Utah 1975) ("trial court is presumed to know 
the law"). 
Finally, "the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
[Palelei]." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. As discussed infra Point 
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I.A., the balance of the evidence against Palelei was weak, 
consisting of identifications of Palelei given by McKnight and 
Swensen, which were even less credible than those of Pudil and 
Davis, as well as a pack of cigarettes that were found on Palelei 
when he was arrested the next day. "Thus, there is fa reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result had the indentification[s] 
not been admitted.1 However, fto ask the trial court to address 
the admissibility question now would . . . tempt it to reach a 
post hoc rationalization for the admission of this pivotal 
evidence.'" Nelson, 950 P.2d at 944 (quoting State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774, 788-89 (Utah 1991)). Accordingly, plain error 
review is appropriate in this matter. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
1208. 
Finally, Paleleifs challenge to the trial court's failure to 
give his requested instruction is preserved at R. 142 [195-201], 
143[206-15]. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The following constitutional provision is determinative of 
the issues on appeal: 
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 7 - Due Process: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(c) (2000) - Motions: 
A motion made before trial shall be determined before 
trial unless the court for good cause orders that the 
ruling be deferred for later determination. Where 
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factual issues are involved in determining a motion, 
the court shall state its findings on the record. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, 
and Disposition in the Court Below. 
Palelei was charged by information with one count of 
robbery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-301 (1999). R.2-4. An arrest warrant issued. R.l. He was 
tried before a jury and convicted as charged. R.142-43. 
Palelei moved to suppress the in-court identifications of 
two of the State's witnesses. R.141[12-24]. The trial court 
denied the motion on the basis that the identifications were 
sufficient to go to the jury. R.141[18,24]. 
Palelei and the State requested a cautionary eyewitness 
identification instruction taken verbatim from footnote eight of 
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 494 (Utah 1986). R.56-59,142[196]; 
see also Addendum B (Palelei's Requested Instruction). The trial 
court gave a different eyewitness instruction over Palelei's 
objection. R.99 (Instruction 13 - Cautionary Eyewitness 
Identification Instruction) 
Palelei timely appeals. R.122-23. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 26, 1999, two clerks, Dale Davis ("Davis") and 
Cody Pudil ("Pudil"), were working at a Maverick convenience 
store in West Valley City between 4:30 and 5:00 a.m. 
5 
R.142[68,71,143]. Two men entered the store, followed by two 
others in short succession. R.142[68,71,84]. The men fanned out 
in the store. R.142[144]. One went into a candy aisle; one went 
to the soda fountain; the other two went to the counter. 
R.142[154]. 
Davis was behind the cash register counter, while Pudil was 
in the back of the store. R.142[70,151]. Pudil went to the 
counter with Davis when the men entered, suspecting that the men 
would cause trouble. R.142[155]. Pudil dialed 911 and left the 
receiver off the phone while the men remained in the store. 
R.142[155]. 
One man, who Pudil and Davis identified as Palelei, came to 
the counter, grabbed a pack of cigarettes, and acted as if he was 
going to purchase them. R.142[146]. Davis rang in the purchase, 
then voided the sale when the man did not pay so that he could 
help the next customer. R.142[92-93]. The man then went behind 
the counter. R.142[146]. He grabbed and wrestled Pudil, threw 
him against a wall and caused him to fall to the floor. 
R.142[147]. Pudil got up and started toward the man. Id. The 
man ordered Pudil onto the floor again. Id. Pudil complied. 
Id. Pudil lay face down on the floor. R.142[159]. Davis 
watched as these events occurred. R.142[95]. 
Meanwhile, Davis slammed the cash register door closed and 
tried to escape from behind the counter. R.142[75,82]. One of 
6 
the men blocked his exit. Id. The man identified as Palelei 
ordered Davis to lay face down on the ground, then to stand up to 
open the register. R.142[75,82-83]. The man pushed Davis and 
Davis opened the register. R.142[75,98]. One of the other men 
walked up to the counter as if to purchase a drink. R.142[75]. 
That man grabbed $20 from the register. R.142[69,75]. Davis was 
ordered back to the floor. R.142[75]. Davis' glasses were 
broken during the incident. R.142[83]. Both Pudil and Davis 
remained on the floor throughout the remainder of the incident. 
R.142[99] . 
During the course of these events, a woman named Catherine 
Swensen ("Swensen") was also at the Maverick store. R.142[110]. 
She drove up to the store and observed four men standing by a 
telephone pole. R.142[lll]. She thought the situation was 
suspicious so she sat in her car for a few minutes. R.142[lll]. 
The men stayed where they were, so Swensen went into the store. 
R.142 [111]. She made a purchase, talked to Davis and Pudil a few 
minutes, then exited. R.142[111-12]. She then saw the four men 
walk into the store. R.142[112]. Swensen watched from her car 
as one of the men threw Pudil against the wall. R.142[112]. She 
went back into the store. R.142[112]. She asked the men what 
was going on. R.142[113]. The men told her to go away. 
R.142[113]. Swensen persisted. R.142[113]. The man identified 
as Palelei came around the counter and confronted her face to 
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face. R.142[137]. He told her to get on the floor two times. 
R.142[137]. Swensen refused. R.142[137]. She watched as the 
four men left the store. R.142[115]. Swensen stated that the 
man identified as Palelei carried four or five cartons of 
cigarettes; the other men carried out cases of beer. R.142[115]. 
Swensen stayed with Pudil and Davis for a few minutes. 
R.142[116]. Davis called the police. R.142[116]. She went 
outside and waved down a passing police car. R.142[116]. 
Davis testified that he was lying on the floor face down 
when he heard Swensen come in. R.142[75-76]. He could not see 
events as they occurred. R.142[77,101]. He heard someone yell 
at her to get on the ground and tell her that it was a robbery. 
R.142 [76]. Davis could not tell whether Swensen actually got on 
the floor. Id. 
Davis testified that the robbery was a frightening 
experience that shook him up. R.142[101]. He explained that the 
events occurred "pretty fast." R.142[84]. He did not notice any 
weapons and did not check to see if any of the men were armed. 
R.142[104]. As the men entered the store in a scattered fashion, 
he tried to keep track of them all. R.142[89]. He was 
concentrating on the cigarettes that the man identified as 
Palelei wanted to buy, as well as the proper sequence of buttons 
that he needed to push on his cash register to ring up the sale, 
rather than the man himself. R.142[93-94]. He was similarly 
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preoccupied with voiding the sale when the man did not pay for 
the cigarettes. R.142[93-94]. Davis testified that he did not 
remember watching the man as he walked around to the back of the 
counter. R.142[95]. He also explained that the glasses that 
were broken during the scuffle were magnifying glasses that he 
used for reading. R.142[100]. 
Davis testified that he had seen the man identified as 
Palelei numerous times before the robbery. R.142[79]. Davis saw 
him in the store three to four times before the incident, and as 
a customer at a car wash that was visible from the store. 
R.142 [79]. Davis, a Caucasian, described the robbers as 
Polynesian. R.142[85]. He also described the men as younger and 
larger than himself. R.142[100]. 
Pudil similarly testified that he recognized the man 
identified as Palelei as a customer in the store about ten times 
before the robbery. R.142[150]. He also saw him at the nearby 
carwash approximately five times. R.142[150]. Pudil, a 
Caucasian, described the men as Polynesian. R.142[153]. He 
stated that three were larger than himself, and one was smaller. 
R.142[153. All the men were younger. R.142[153]. He did not 
see any weapons on the men. R.142[154]. 
Pudil also testified that the incident was frightening and 
occurred quickly. R.142[151,160]. He did not see the events 
happening once he was lying face down on the floor. R.142[160]. 
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He could only see the mens' feet and legs from his vantage point. 
R.142 [160]. He heard the men ordering Davis to do certain things 
then to get on the floor. R.142[160]. 
Detective William McKnight ("McKnight") went to the Maverick 
store to investigate the robbery later that morning. R.142 [168-
69,170], He viewed a surveillance video that recorded the 
incident. R.142[169]. He identified one of the men in the video 
as Palelei. R.142[170]. McKnight recognized the man from the 
time when he worked at a high school that Palelei attended. 
R.142[170-71]. McKnight testified that he was not present when 
the robbery occurred and could identify the robber only from the 
surveillance video. R.142[171]. 
Detective Kirt Imig ("Imig") was also at the Maverick store 
later that morning to investigate the robbery. R.142[178]. He 
assembled a photo array containing a picture of Palelei. 
R.142 [178]. He showed the array to Davis and Pudil. R.142[178]. 
Although both Pudil and Davis recognized the man identified as 
Palelei as a former customer, neither picked Palelei from the 
array. R.142[179-80]. Pudil and Davis, however, identified 
Palelei in court. R.142[73,145] . Pudil also identified Palelei 
at the preliminary hearing. R.141[16]. 
Imig showed the array to McKnight as well. R.142[180]. 
Only McKnight, who identified Palelei from the surveillance 
video, was able to identify Palelei from the array. Id. 
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The day after the robbery Officer Brandon Shopay ("Shopay") 
received a call from dispatch indicating that Palelei was turning 
himself in and could be located at 4686 Arlington Park Drive. 
R.142[165]. He found Palelei at that address and arrested him. 
R.142[166]. When he booked Palelei into jail, he found two boxes 
of cigarettes and a pair of sunglasses on his person. Id. These 
were admitted as evidence at trial. R.142[167]. 
Palelei made a pretrial motion to suppress the eyewitness 
identification evidence from Pudil and Davis. He explained that 
it was constitutionally unreliable given the frightful 
circumstances under which it was made; the fact that they were a 
cross-racial identifications; that the incident occurred quickly; 
that the observers were distracted because four men entered the 
store and were in several places at the same time, they were 
physically pushed to the floor, Davis' glasses were broken in the 
scuffle, and their view was obstructed because they were lying on 
the floor face down for most of the time; that the 
identifications were inconsistent since neither Pudil nor Davis 
could identify Palelei from the photo array, yet identified him 
in court at the preliminary hearing and at trial; that Palelei 
was the only person in the courtroom during the Preliminary 
hearing wearing jail clothes and handcuffed. R.14-22, 142 [12-
24]. The trial court denied the motion reasoning that the 
identifications were sufficient to go to the jury. R.142[18,24]. 
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At the close of trial, Palelei requested a cautionary 
eyewitness identification instruction taken verbatim from 
footnote eight of the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in State v. 
Long, 721 P.2d 483, 494 (Utah 1986). R.56-59. The State offered 
the same cautionary instruction. The trial court declined to 
submit that instruction, giving its own significantly trimmed 
down version instead. R.99. Palelei objected on the basis that 
it did not adequately apprise the jury of the inherent weaknesses 
of eyewitness testimony, the factors that must be considered in 
weighing eyewitness testimony, nor inform the jury of the State's 
burden of proof in light of such testimony. R.142[195-201], 
143[206-15]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Palelei1s case merits a new trial on the basis that the 
trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to make factual 
findings and legal conclusions on the record as required by State 
v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 944-45 (Utah App. 1997). The case also 
merits a new trial because the court erred in admitting the 
eyewitness identifications of Pudil and Davis although they were 
not constitutionally reliable under the totality of the 
circumstances. See Utah Const, art. I, § 7 (Due Process); State 
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780-81 (Utah 1991). 
Alternatively, Paleleifs case merits a new trial where the 
trial court submitted a cautionary eyewitness identification 
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instruction that did not educate the jury as to the inherent 
weaknesses of such evidence in violation of Palelei's due process 
rights. See Utah Const, art. I, § 7; State v. Long, 721 P.2d 
483, 494 (Utah 1986). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING CONSTITUTIONALLY 
UNRELIABLE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY WHERE IT 
DID NOT MAKE THE REQUIRED FINDINGS IN SUPPORT OF ITS 
LEGAL CONCLUSION AND ITS DECISION WAS NOT SUPPORTED 
UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
A. The Trial Court Erred As a Matter of Law In Failing 
To Make the Requisite Factual Findings and Conclusions 
of Law on the Record in Support of its Legal 
Determination That the Identification Evidence Is 
Reliable. 
Palelei's case merits a new trial where the trial court 
erred as a matter of law in failing to make the requisite 
findings of fact on the record in support of its legal conclusion 
that the identification evidence was constitutionally reliable. 
See Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c) (2000); State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 
944-45 (Utah 1997). 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(c) states: 
[a] motion made before trial shall be determined before 
trial unless the court for good cause orders that the 
ruling be deferred for later determination. Where 
factual issues are involved in determining a motion, 
the court shall state its findings on the record. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
This Court in Nelson held that Rule 12(c) requires courts to 
make findings on the record "'when presented with the issue of the 
13 
constitutional admissibility of eyewitness identification 
testimony." Nelson, 950 P.2d at 944. The Court premised its 
holding upon State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), which 
established that a trial court has a "gatekeeping responsibility 
. . . to determine the constitutional admissibility of the 
eyewitness identification testimony." Nelson, 950 P.2d at 944 
(citing Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778)). A trial court's gatekeeping 
function arises out of "particular[] concern[] about the 
'[pjotential for role confusion and for erosion of constitutional 
guarantees inhere[nt] in th[e] overlap of responsibility of judge 
and jury.1" Nelson, 950 P.2d at 943 (quoting Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 
778)); see also Utah Const, art. I, § 7 ("[n]o person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law") . 
Accordingly, in assessing the admissibility of an 
identification, a trial court must consider certain pertinent 
factors on the record, including: 
"'(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the 
actor during the event; (2) the witness's degree of 
attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) 
the witness's capacity to observe the event, including 
his or her physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the 
witness's identification was made spontaneously and 
remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the 
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event 
being observed and the likelihood that the witness 
would perceive, remember and relate it correctly. This 
last area includes such factors as whether the event 
was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during 
the time it was observed, and whether the race of the 
actor was the same as the observer's.'" 
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Nelson, 950 P.2d at 943 (quoting Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 
(quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493)). 
By this reasoning, the Nelson Court vacated the defendant's 
conviction and remanded for a new trial where the lower court 
>xfail[ed] to make any findings, fail[ed] to consider all the 
circumstances surrounding the identification in light of the 
Ramirez factors, and fail[ed] to determine initially whether [the 
witness1] eyewitness identification was reliable." Id. at 945. 
This Court stated that the lower court "sidestepped its 
gatekeeping responsibility" by simply stating, "'[U]nless there's 
something unusual here, it's an issue of fact as to whether or 
not the eyewitness is reliable . . . . So what I'd be inclined to 
do is let it go to the jury, and not suppress the 
identification.'" Id. at 944 (quoting suppression hearing 
transcript). 
Nelson compels a like conclusion in this case. As in 
Nelson, Palelei filed a motion to suppress the eyewitness 
identification evidence from Davis and Pudil. R.14-22 (Written 
Motion); 141 (Suppression Hearing). He noted that the 
identifications were made under frightful circumstances; the fact 
that they were a cross-racial; that the incident occurred 
quickly; that the observers were distracted because four men 
entered the store and were in several places at the same time; 
that the observers were physically pushed to the floor and their 
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view was obstructed because they remained there for most of the 
incident with only a view of the mens1 legs; Davis' glasses were 
broken in the scuffle; that the identifications were inconsistent 
since neither Pudil nor Davis could identify Palelei from the 
photo array, yet Pudil identified him in court at the preliminary 
hearing; and that Palelei was the only person in the courtroom 
during the Preliminary hearing wearing jail clothes and 
handcuffed. R.14-22, 141[12-24]; see also Nelson, 950 P.2d at 
942 (defendant proffered evidence to court mitigating against 
reliability of identification, and offered to present expert 
witness to testify to the same). 
Despite Paleleifs argument in support of his motion, the 
"the suppression hearing record shows that the trial court did 
not make findings as required by Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, [] did not consider any of the circumstances 
surrounding the identification in light of the Ramirez factors, 
and did not make a preliminary determination of reliability." 
Nelson, 950 P.2d at 943-44 (footnote omitted). Rather, the judge 
merely stated, "[w]ell, as far as that goes, I'm going to deny 
your motion, because I think [Pudil's] identification of the 
defendant when he walks in the door is sufficient." R.141[18]. 
The court similarly admitted Davis' identification, stating only 
"[i]f [Davis] does identify your client in court, then I think 
you've got a right to cross-examine him on the reliability of the 
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identification." R.141[24]. The record does not show that the 
court established any other findings of fact or conclusions of 
law on the record, either verbally or in writing. See Nelson, 
950 P.2d at 944 (finding error where trial court, addressing 
reliability issue, merely stated "'it's an issue of fact as to 
whether or not the eyewitness is reliable . . . . So what I'd be 
inclined to do is let it got to the jury'") (quoting suppression 
hearing transcript). 
In failing to make the required findings or consider the 
Ramirez factors in making the preliminary reliability 
determination, the "trial court sidestepped its gatekeeping 
responsibility." Id. (citing Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778). The 
trial court's "failure to make any findings and failure to make 
any legal determination as to the constitutional admissibility of 
[Davis' and Pudil's] eyewitness identification testimony was 
error." Id. (citation omitted). 
Moreover, the error is harmful. Id. (applying harmless 
error analysis). An error is harmful in this context if the rest 
of the evidence against the appellant is weak, creating "'a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result had the 
identification not been admitted.'" Nelson, 950 P.2d at 944 
(quoting Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 788-89). In such instances, "'[t]o 
ask the trial court to address the admissibility question now 
would . . . tempt it to reach a post hoc rationalization for the 
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admission of this pivotal evidence."' Id. (quoting Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 789). 
In light of the Nelson standard for harmfulnessf Paleleifs 
case merits a new trial because the rest of the evidence against 
him is weak. For example, Officer Shopay testified that he 
arrested Palelei the day following the incident, and found two 
boxes of cigarettes and a pair of sunglasses on his person during 
the jailhouse search. R.142[164-67]. Cigarettes and sunglasses 
are common possessions, and the fact of their presence alone does 
not provide a compelling or sufficient link between Palelei and 
the robbery, especially since they were not found on his person 
immediately after the incident or even on the same day, but 
rather the next day. R.142[164-67]. Palelei could have acquired 
the cigarettes at any time before or after his arrest. 
The other evidence against Palelei is also weak and 
underscores the harmfulness of the court's error. Shopay made a 
vague assertion at trial that Palelei had "called to surrender." 
R.142[165]. Shopay claimed that he learned of Palelei's 
"surrender" through the West Valley City Police dispatcher. Id. 
The State did not produce any evidence as to what Palelei was 
"surrender[ing]" to, i.e. involvement in this crime or another 
offense. Moreover, the State did not present the dispatcher to 
clarify the details of Paleleifs alleged "surrender." 
The only other evidence against Palelei consisted of weak 
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identifications made by Detective McKnight and Swensen. For 
instance, McKnight identified Palelei based on the surveillance 
video. R.142[170]. He did not actually view Palelei in the 
store at the time of the robbery. R.142[171]. Indeed, McKnight 
was not in the store when the robbery occurred. R.142[171]. 
Additionally, McKnight's identification was based on his prior 
acquaintance with Palelei when McKnight worked at a highschool 
attended by Palelei. R.142[170-71]. However, nothing in 
McKnight's testimony provides any foundation for the 
identification, such as whether Palelei had distinctive features 
that resembled those of the man in the video; whether Paleleifs 
appearance remained substantially the same from the time he 
attended the high school to the time that McKnight identified him 
in the video; or the length of time between McKnightfs prior 
acquaintance with Palelei and the robbery. All of these factors 
bear upon McKnight's familiarity with Palelei's appearance at the 
time of the robbery and, consequently, the credibility of his 
identification of Palelei from the surveillance video.1 
Swensen1s identification similarly lacks credibility. She 
viewed the person identified as Palelei for only a brief time. 
1
 McKnight's identification of Palelei from a photo array 
is not compelling for the same reasons that his identification of 
Palelei from the surveillance video is unpersuasive evidence of 
guilt. Moreover, it was McKnight's video identification that led 
to the inclusion of Palelei in the photo array, which further 
undermines the chain between McKnight's prior acquaintance with 
Palelei and the array identification. 
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Moreover, her observation was made in the midst of a heated 
confrontation with the person, who was ordering her to get to the 
ground. She was also distracted from getting a good look at the 
actor since her attention was focused on Pudil and Davis, who had 
been pushed to the floor by the robbers. 
In light of the foregoing, the trial court's error in 
failing to make factual findings or legal conclusions on the 
record regarding the constitutional admissibility of the 
eyewitness identification evidence merits a new trial. See 
Nelson, 950 P.2d 944-45; Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c). The balance of 
the evidence against Palelei is weak. See Nelson, 950 P.2d at 
944. Accordingly, there is a Mlreasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result had the identification not been admitted.f" Id. 
(quoting Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 788-89). "fTo ask the trial court 
to address the admissibility question now would . . . tempt it to 
reach a post hoc rationalization for the admission of this 
pivotal evidence.f" Id. (quoting Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 789). 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Submitting the Eyewitness 
Identification Evidence to the Jury Where its 
Reliability Was Not Supported under the Totality of the 
Circumstances. 
The trial court erred in admitting the eyewitness 
identification evidence because it is constitutionally unreliable 
under the totality of the circumstances. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
at 781 ("ultimate question to be determined is whether, under the 
totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable"). 
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Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution guarantees 
that, "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." This provision requires 
that eyewitness identification evidence must be reliable under 
the totality of the circumstances. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781. 
The following factors are pertinent to the reliability analysis: 
"(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the actor 
during the event; (2) the witness's degree of attention 
to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the 
witness's capacity to observe the event, including his 
or her physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the 
witness's identification was made spontaneously and 
remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the 
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event 
being observed and the likelihood that the witness 
would perceive, remember and relate it correctly. This 
last area includes such factors as whether the event 
was an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during 
the time it was observed, and whether the race of the 
actor was the same as the observer's." 
Id. (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 1986)). 
These factors are premised on empirical data establishing the 
fallibility of such evidence; a jury's tendency to be unaware of 
the inherent weaknesses of human recall and to give an 
identification undue weight; and the resulting potential for 
"erosion of constitutional guarantees." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 
778-80 (citing Long, 721 P.2d at 488-90) (discussing weaknesses 
of memory)). 
The eyewitness identification evidence in this case is 
constitutionally unreliable under the Ramirez factors. First, 
the eyewitnesses had limited or no "^opportunity . . . to view 
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the actor during the event.'" Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 (quoting 
Long, 721 P.2d at 493). Moreover, their "'degree of attention to 
the actor at the time of the event'" was severely compromised by 
the circumstances of the robbery. Id. 
For example, Both Pudil and Davis testified that the robbery 
occurred very quickly. R.142[84,151]; see Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 
782 ("length of time [] witness viewed [] actor" bears upon 
reliability). They also testified that they noticed the four men 
scatter into different areas of the store as they entered. 
R.142 [89,153] . Hence, neither Pudil nor Davis were focused on 
any single man, let alone the person identified as Palelei. 
Additionally, Davis testified that he was distracted as he 
rang in, then voided, the sale of a box of cigarettes on the cash 
register and, therefore, was not looking at the man buying them 
(allegedly Palelei). R.142[93-94]. He was similarly distracted 
as he watched the man push Pudil onto the floor. R.142[95]; see 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782 (noting deleterious effect of 
"distracting noises or activity" on eyewitness identification). 
Moreover, both Pudil and Davis were lying face down on the 
floor for most of the robbery. R142[75,99,147]. Hence, they 
could not see the mens1 faces, but only their legs. R.142[160]; 
see Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782 (considering "whether the witness 
could view the actor's face" as pertinent to reliability of 
identification). 
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Finally, although both Pudil and Davis testified that they 
saw Palelei in the Maverick store and at the carwash next to the 
store on prior occasions, R.142[79,150], neither man testified 
that they were paying particularly close attention to the actor 
at the time of the robbery. See generally R.142[68-104,143-65]. 
Accordingly, the evidence does not establish that they were 
making a mental note of their assailant such that their 
identifications are reliable in this instance. Compare Ramirez, 
817 P.2d at 783 (witness stared at defendant "trying to get a 
good description"); State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1237 (Utah 
App. 1995) (victim observed assailant with purpose of identifying 
him later). 
The eyewitness identifications are also unreliable under the 
circumstances given "'the witness[es'] capacity to observe the 
event, including [their] physical and mental acuity. "' Ramirez, 
817 P.2d at 781 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493). Davis testified 
that his reading glasses were broken during the scuffle when he 
was pushed to the ground. R.142[83]. Hence, his physical 
ability to view the actor was impaired. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 
783 (considering witness1 "uncorrected visual defects'' in 
reliability analysis). 
Moreover, both Pudil and Davis testified that the robbery 
was an extremely frightening event. R.142[101, 160]; see 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783 ("relevant circumstances include whether 
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witness[esf] capacity to observe was impaired by stress or 
fright"). Neither Pudil or Davis testified that their fear was 
not a distracting factor. See generally R.142[68-104,143-64]; 
compare State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, 544, 993 P.2d 837 
(eyewitness "testified that her fear did not distract her from 
focusing on [actor] and placing his image in her mind"). 
The identifications are unreliable for the added reason that 
they are not consistent. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 (citing 
Long, 721 P.2d at 493). According to Detective McKnight, Pudil 
and Davis identified Palelei as one of the robbers because they 
had seen Palelei in the store prior to the incident. R.142[170-
71]. However, neither Pudil nor Davis identified Palelei from a 
photo array that was presented to them a few days after the 
robbery by Detective Imig. R.142[179-80]. Nonetheless Pudil was 
able to identify Palelei at a subsequent preliminary hearing 
while Palelei was in jail clothing and sitting at the defense 
table at the time.2 R.141[16]. Moreover, both Davis and Pudil 
identified Palelei at his trial. R.142[73,145]. 
The fact that Pudil and Davis testified that they recognized 
Palelei as a customer in the store on prior occasions also 
undermines the credibility of the identifications. As noted in 
Long warned: 
2
 To this extent, the identification evidence is unreliable 
because it is the "'product of suggestion.1" Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
at 781 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493). 
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[a]nother mechanism we all develop to compensate for 
our inability to perceive all aspects of an event at 
once is a series of logical inferences: if we see one 
thing, we assume, based on our past experience, that we 
also saw another that ordinarily follows. This way we 
can "perceive" a whole event in our mind's eye when we 
have actually seen or heard only portions of it. The 
implications of this memory strategy for court 
proceedings are similar to those of selective 
perception. 
Id. at 48 9. The same phenomenon occurs when an observer is 
familiar with a person: once that person is seen in a place, it 
is "assume[d], based on [] past experience," that the person is 
the suspect who was involved in the crime. Id. Hence, where 
both Pudil and Davis were familiar with Palelei, the reliability 
of their identifications is undermined, and the trial court erred 
in failing to suppress them. Id. 
As a final matter, the identifications are unreliable given 
"'the nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that 
the witness [es] would perceive, remember and relate it 
correctly.1" Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 
493). Specifically, the identifications made by Pudil and Davis 
were cross-racial. See id. (noting that race of witness and 
actor as affects to reliability). Pudil and Davis are Caucasian. 
R.142[85,152] . The men who robbed the store were described by 
Pudil and Davis as Polynesian. Id. As noted in Long, it is a 
"well-documented fact that identifications tend to be more 
accurate where the person observing and the one being observed 
are of the same race." 721 P.2d at 489 (citations omitted); see 
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also State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, 129, 984 P.2d 376 (holding 
that counsel rendered ineffective assistance where he failed to 
request cautionary eyewitness identification instruction in part 
because identification was cross-racial). 
In light of the foregoing, the trial court erred in 
admitting the eyewitness identification evidence from Pudil and 
Davis where the totality of the circumstances does not support 
their constitutional reliability. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781; 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
FAILING TO GIVE PALELEI'S REQUESTED CAUTIONARY 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION INSTRUCTION. 
Alternatively, the trial court erred as a matter of law in 
failing to give Palelei's requested cautionary eyewitness 
identification instruction. See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 
238 (Utah 1992) (reviewing denial to give requested instruction 
for correctness without deference to trial court). 
In the present case, Palelei requested a cautionary 
eyewitness instruction taken verbatim from footnote eight of 
Long, 721 P.2d at 494. See R.56-59 (Defendant's Requested 
Instruction) (Addendum B). The State requested the same 
instruction. R.142[196]. 
The trial court declined to give the instruction, submitting 
instead an instruction which reads as follows: 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
Identification testimony is an expression of 
belief or impression by the witness. Its value depends 
on the opportunity the witness had to observe the 
offender at the time of the offense and to make a 
reliable identification later. 
In appraising the identification testimony of a 
witness, you should consider the following: 
1. The opportunity of the witness to view the 
actor during the event; 
2. The witness's degree of attention to the actor 
at the time of the event; 
3. The witness's capacity to observe the event 
and whether the witness's capacity may have been 
impaired because of stress or fright, biases or 
prejudices, fatigue or injury; or uncorrected visual 
defects, 
4. Whether the witness had occasion to see or 
know the actor in the past; 
5. Whether the witness is of a different race 
than the actor. Identification by a person of a 
different race may be less reliable than identification 
by a person of the same race; 
6. Whether the witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent; 
7. The length of time between the incident and 
identification 
8. If the witness failed to identify the actor on 
any occasion; 
9. You may also [sic] into account that 
identifications made from seeing the person are 
generally more reliable than identifications made from 
a photograph and that identification made by picking 
the actor from a group of similar individuals is 
generally more reliable than an identification made 
from the actor being presented alone to the witness; 
and 
10. The nature of the event being observed and 
the likelihood that the witness would perceive, 
remember and relate it correctly. 
R.99 ("Instruction No. 13" or "instruction"). 
In giving this significantly reduced version of the Long 
instruction, the trial court reasoned that it need only address 
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the general factors set forth in Long, 721 P.2d at 494, and that 
it could otherwise tailor it to suit the case at bar. R.143 
[206]. The court also noted that the additional factors 
requested by Palelei that were dictum. R.143[209]. Moreover, 
the court stated that it would not include language in its 
instruction regarding the State's burden of proof because that 
was already covered in another instruction submitted to the jury. 
R.103 (Courtfs Instruction on Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt). 
Finally, the court noted that Palelei could argue any particular 
points applicable to the broader parameters relevant to 
eyewitness identification in his closing argument to the jury. 
R.143[218]. 
The trial court's submission of this version of a cautionary 
instruction constitutes legal error because it does not correctly 
instruct the jury as to the law concerning the inherent 
weaknesses of eyewitness identification evidence. See State v. 
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1231 (Utah 1997) (trial court must 
"instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the 
case"). The Utah Supreme Court in Long mandated that "trial 
courts shall give [a cautionary instruction] whenever eyewitness 
identification is a central issue in a case and such an 
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instruction is requested by the defense." 721 P.2d at 492. 
The Long Court, however, declined to adopt one specific 




formulating instructions." Id. It nonetheless required an 
instruction that adequately "apprise[s] the jury of the inherent 
limitations of eyewitness identification," Long, 721 P.2d at 492, 
and warns against those that are "so short and superficial as to 
be of little utility in accomplishing [this] objective." Id. at 
493. 
To guide the trial courts, we note that a proper 
instruction should sensitize the jury to the factors 
that empirical research have shown to be of importance 
in determining the accuracy of eyewitness 
identifications, especially those that laypersons most 
likely would not appreciate. These factors should 
include not only the externals, like the quality of the 
lighting and the time available for observation, but 
also the internal or subjective factors, such as the 
likelihood of accurate perception, storage and 
retrieval of the information by a witness. For 
example, an instruction should address the following 
commonly accepted areas of concern: (1) the opportunity 
of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) 
the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the 
time of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to 
observe the event, including his or her mental acuity; 
(4) whether the witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or 
whether it was the product of suggestion; and (5) the 
nature of the event being observed and the likelihood 
that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it 
correctly. This last area includes such factors as 
whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind of 
the observer during the time it was observed, and 
whether the race of the actor was the same as the 
observer's. 
Id. at 492-93. Only in apprising the jury of such information 
may a court "offer [the] defendant some protection from false 
conviction, while ensuring the efficacy of the jury system by 
providing jurors with the knowledge necessary for sound decision 
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making." Id. at 4 92 (noting that an inadequate cautionary 
instruction "could well deny the defendant due process of law 
under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution"). 
Instruction 13 fails to pass constitutional muster. 
Although it roughly sets forth the five core Long factors, it 
does not sufficiently address the "internal and subjective 
factors" affecting the accuracy of eyewitness identification 
thereunder. Id. at 4 93. For instance, the instruction informs 
the jury that it should consider the "opportunity of the witness 
to view the actor during the event." R.99. However, it does not 
instruct as to any of the "circumstances of the observation 
[which] are critical'' to that consideration. Long, 721 P. 2d at 
488 (emphasis added). The Long Court identified such "critical" 
elements as the witness's "distance" from the actor, "length of 
time available to perceive the event, and the amount of movement 
involved." Id. 
In fact, there was a flurry of distracting activity that 
affected the identifications made by Pudil and Davis since four 
men came into the store and spread into different directions. 
Moreover, Davis was distracted from looking at the man he 
identified as Palelei since he was concentrating on ringing in 
and voiding the sale of cigarettes, then on Pudil as he was 
pushed to the floor. Likewise, the event occurred very quickly 
and both Pudil and Davis were prohibited from viewing their 
30 
assailants' faces since they were lying on the floor and could 
only see their feet. Hence, the "circumstances of the 
observation[s]" in the present case required a fuller instruction 
than the one the court gave. Id. at 488. 
In addition, Instruction 13 does not apprise the jury of 
factors concerning a witness's observation of a daily occurrence 
versus a known criminal event. See generally R.99. Rather, the 
instruction vaguely states that the jury should consider "the 
witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the 
event" and "the nature of the event being observed and the 
likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate 
it correctly." R.99. 
The Long Court discussed at length the shortcomings of human 
recall when a person views an event that he or she at first takes 
to be commonplace, explaining: 
[a] far less obvious limitation of great importance 
arises from the fact that the human brain cannot 
receive and store all the stimuli simultaneously 
presented to it. This forces people to be selective in 
what they perceive of any given event. To accomplish 
this selective perception successfully, over time each 
person develops unconscious strategies for determining 
what elements of an event are important enough to be 
selected out for perception. The rest of the stimuli 
created by the event are ignored by the brain. These 
unconscious strategies of selective perception work 
quite well in our day-to-day lives to provide us with 
only the most commonly useful information, but the 
strategies may result in the exclusion of information 
that will later prove important in a court proceeding. 
For example, the significance of the event to the 
witness at the time of the perception is very 
important. Thus, people usually remember with some 
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detail and clarity their whereabouts at the time [of a 
significant event.] Those same people, however, are 
generally less accurate in their descriptions of people 
. . . encountered only recently in the course of their 
daily routines. . . . An everyday situation . . . 
presents an excellent opportunity to observe, and yet, 
while such information may be a critical element in a 
criminal trial, our process of selective perception 
usually screens out such data completely. To the 
extent that court proceedings may focus on events that 
were not of particular importance to the observer at 
the time they occurred, then, the observer may have 
absolutely no memory of the facts simply because he or 
she failed to select the critical information for 
perception. 
Id. at 489 (citations and footnote omitted). 
Despite Long's lengthy treatment of the subject, the court 
below dismissed the necessity of including anything in 
Instruction 13 about the observance of seemingly ordinary events 
as inapplicable to the facts of the case at bar. R.142[198]. In 
fact, the testimony of Davis establishes that he was not aware 
that anything out of the ordinary was occurring when the men 
walked into the store; he was carrying on with his cashier 
duties, ringing in and voiding purchases just as he would any 
other day. Given the seemingly insignificant nature of the mens' 
presence, Davis was not likely to perceive details of the actors 
that would be critical to an accurate identification at trial. 
See Long, 721 P.2d at 489. Accordingly, an instruction which 
alerted the jury to the limitations of human recall when 
observing ordinary events was appropriate and necessary. Id. 
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Instruction 13 also adds a misleading element that is not 
mentioned in the Long opinion. Specifically, the instruction 
directs the jurors to consider "[w]hether the witness had 
occasion to see or know the actor in the past." R.99. The trial 
court claimed that this element was adopted from Long. 
R.143[219]. 
Although a similar element quoted from a British study was 
cited favorably in Long, nothing in the opinion itself posits 
this is a valid factor for consideration in assessing the 
accuracy of eyewitness identifications under Utah law. See Long, 
721 P.2d at 491. If anything, Long warns against allowing jurors 
to place too much weight upon the fact that an observer may be 
familiar with the suspect. As with the limitations arising out 
of the mind's tendency to selectively perceive events, Long 
warned: 
[a]nother mechanism we all develop to compensate for 
our inability to perceive all aspects of an event at 
once is a series of logical inferences: if we see one 
thing, we assume, based on our past experience, that we 
also saw another that ordinarily follows. This way we 
can "perceive" a whole event in our mind's eye when we 
have actually seen or heard only portions of it. The 
implications of this memory strategy for court 
proceedings are similar to those of selective 
perception. 
Id. at 489. The same theory holds true when an observer is 
familiar with a person: once that person is seen in a place, it 
is "assume[d], based on [] past experience," that the person is 
the suspect who was involved in the crime. Id. 
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Hence, where both Pudil and Davis were previously familiar 
with Palelei, the trial court erred as a matter of law in 
instructing the jury that they should consider whether they "had 
occasion to see or know the actor in the past," R.99, without 
also warning against the deleterious effects of such an 
acquaintance upon an identification. See Long, 721 P.2d at 489. 
The error is underscored given that Davis and Pudil did not 
identify Palelei from the photo array, and yet were able to 
positively identify him at trial. R.142[73,145]. 
Additionally, Instruction 13 wholly fails to instruct the 
jury that the State bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. See generally R.99. The instruction also fails to give 
Palelei's requested and related provision that a witness, 
although sincere, may nonetheless provide an inaccurate 
identification. Id.; see also R. 56 (Palelei's Proposed 
Instruction). As to the State's burden of proof, the trial court 
stated that it need not include such a clause in Instruction 13 
because it submitted an additional instruction describing the 
State's burden of proof. R.103 (Instruction 17 - Proof Beyond 
Reasonable Doubt); 142[201], 143[215]. 
Although a "defendant is not entitled to an instruction 
which is redundant or repetitive of principles enunciated in 
other instructions given to the jury," State v. McCumber, 622 
P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 1980), the particular and well-documented 
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dangers of identification evidence require that the State's 
burden of proof be reiterated in the context of the cautionary 
instruction itself in order to balance out the unduly persuasive 
effect of such evidence upon a naive jury. The related provision 
addressing a witness' inaccurate, albeit sincere, identification 
is required for the same reason. As noted in Long, 
[a]lthough research has convincingly demonstrated the 
weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification, 
jurors are, for the most part, unaware of these 
problems. People simply do not accurately understand 
the deleterious effects that certain variables can have 
on the accuracy of the memory processes of an honest 
eyewitness. Moreover, the common knowledge that people 
do possess often runs contrary to documented research 
findings. 
Perhaps it is precisely because jurors do not 
appreciate the fallibility of eyewitness testimony that 
they give such testimony great weight. 
Id. at 490 (citing study documenting that jury is significantly 
more likely to convict when eyewitness identification evidence is 
presented) (citations omitted). 
In light of this, the trial court erred in giving an 
instruction that did not reinforce the State's burden of proof 
nor apprise the jury of the possibility of a sincere, but 
inaccurate, identification. Indeed, in omitting such critical 
information, the court actually subverted the constitutionally 
mandated proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard since it did 
not emphasize the heightened importance of the State's burden in 
light of a jury's tendency to give undue weight to identification 
evidence. See In re Winshio, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 
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25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (federal due process requires "proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime ... charged"). 
As a final matter, the erroneous submission of Instruction 
13 merits a new trial because the error was harmful. See Biswell 
v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah App. 1987) (reviewing court's 
denial to submit instruction for harmless error). An erroneous 
instruction is harmful if it "tends to mislead the jury to the 
prejudice [of Palelei] or insufficiently or erroneously advises 
the jury on the law." Id. For the reasons set forth supra, the 
instruction was misleading and inadequately advised the jury as 
to well-settled law regarding the limitations and fallibility of 
eyewitness identification evidence. Since the jury was not 
properly informed, it did not have the "knowledge necessary for 
sound decision making." Long, 721 P.2d at 492. Consequently, 
Palelei was not adequately "protect[ed] from false conviction" in 
violation of his Article I, Section 7 due process rights. Id.; 
see, e.g., Summerhill v. Shipley, 890 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah App. 
1995) (prejudicial error where "jury was probably misled by the 
erroneous omission of requested instruction more fully explaining 
the correct standard of care" in negligence case); Robinson v. 
All-Star Delivery, Inc., 1999 UT 109 111, 992 P.2d 969, 974 (Utah 
1999) (finding prejudice where "court's refusal to give [] 
proposed instruction left the jury without the necessary 
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principles for deciding how damages should be apportioned"). 
The fact that Palelei was able to cover the information 
erroneously omitted from Instruction 13 in his closing argument 
does not render the error harmless. See State v. Tinoco, 860 
P.2d 988, 990 (Utah App. 1993) (concluding that failure to give 
requested instruction was not error in part where defendant 
addressed missing portions in closing argument). As noted by 
defense counsel below, a written instruction on the law is more 
persuasive in the mind of a juror than arguments of counsel. 
R.143[218]. Indeed, the jury in this case was instructed to 
distance its deliberations from arguments of counsel to the 
extent that they were told that arguments of counsel do not 
constitute evidence. R.104 (Instruction 18). Accordingly, 
Palelei's closing arguments did not cure the harm that resulted 
from the trial court's erroneous submission of Instruction 13. 
As a final matter, the trial court's error was prejudicial 
because the balance of the evidence in this case consisted mostly 
of eyewitness identifications made by Davis, Pudil, McKnight and 
Swensen. See supra Point I.A. & I.B. (discussing weaknesses of 
identification evidence); see also Tinoco, 860 P.2d at 990 
(assessing overall quality of evidence in determining harmfulness 
of court's jury instruction). The only other evidence linking 
Palelei to the robbery consisted of a pack of cigarettes that 
were found on his person when he was arrested the following day. 
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Id. However, cigarettes are a common place and readily 
accessible item that do not provide a sufficient or compelling 
link to the crime, especially considering that they were found 
the next day and not immediately following the incident. Id. 
Given the overall weakness of the evidence against Palelei, the 
court's erroneous submission of the inadequate cautionary 
instruction likely affected the outcome of his trial, i.e., the 
jury placed undue weight upon the identification evidence without 
a full understanding of its inherent limitations in violation of 
Paleleifs Article I, Section 7 due process rights. See Long, 721 
P.2d at 492. 
In light of the foregoing, the trial court erred as a matter 
of law in submitting Instruction 13 since it did not adequately 
apprise the jury of the inherent limitations of eyewitness 
identification evidence. Id. Moreover, the error merits a 
mistrial because it is harmful. See Biswell, 742 P.2d at 88 
(reviewing court's instruction for harmless error). 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Palelei respectfully requests 
this Court to vacate his conviction and remand for a new trial on 
the basis that the trial court erred as a matter of law failing 
to make the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law 
regarding the admissibility of the eyewitness identification 
evidence. A new trial is also required where the court 
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erroneously admitted identification evidence that is not 
constitutionally reliable. Alternatively, Palelei requests this 
Court to vacate his conviction and remand for a new trial where 
the trial court misinstructed the jury as to the law regarding 
eyewitness identification evidence. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 21**- day of November, 2000. 
(Jrt^e > cth^fr 
CATHERINE E. LILLY 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GORDAN MASAGALUL PALELEI, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 991924409 FS 
Judge: L. A. DEVER 
Date: June 12, 2 000 
PRESENT 
Clerk: audreyj 
Prosecutor: MORGAN, B. KENT 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): REMAL, LISA J. 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 8, 1980 
Video 
Tape Number: video Tape Count: 10:56 
CHARGES 
1. ROBBERY - 2nd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 06/12/2000 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ROBBERY a 2nd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ROBBERY a 2nd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to a term of 6 month(s) in the Salt Lake 
County Jail. 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
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Date: Jun 12, 2000 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $5000.00 
Suspended: $5000.00 
Due: $0.00 
Total Fine: $5000.00 
Total Suspended: $5000.00 
Total Surcharge: $0 
Total Principal Due: $0 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE 
Pay $50 per month beginning upon release from jail. 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Restitution: Amount: $236.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: STATE TO PROVIDE 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $500.00 
Pay in behalf of: LDA 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole, 
Defendant to serve 180 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jail. 
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PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Participate in and complete any educational; and/or vocational 
training as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Violate no laws. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Pay restitution as determined by Probation Officer. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Complete GED while in the jail 
Cognitive restructuring program 
All gang conditions 
No contact with co-defendant or sons of Samoa gang 
Do not go to any Maverick store in Summit or Tooele county 
Pay restitution $236 in full 
Report to AP&P regularly 
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ADDENDUM B 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
One of the most important questions in this case is the identification of the defendant as 
the person who committed the crime. The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt, not only that the crime was committed, but also that the defendant was the 
person who committed the crime. If, after considering the evidence you have heard from both 
sides, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who 
committed the crime, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
The identification testimony that you have heard was an expression of belief or 
impression by the witness. To find the defendant not guilty, you need not believe that the 
identification witness was insincere, but merely that the witness was mistaken in his/her belief or 
impression. 
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification. In considering whether the prosecution 
has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the crime, 
you should consider the following: 
1. Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to observe the criminal actor? In 
answering this question, you should consider: 
a) the length of time the witnesses observed the actor; 
b) the distance between the witness and the actor; 
c) the extent to which the actor's features were visible 
and undisguised; 
d) the light or lack of light at the place and time of 
observation; 
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e) the presence or absence of distracting noises or activity during the observation; 
f) any other circumstances affecting the witness' opportunity to observe the person 
committing the crime. 
2. Did the witnesses have the capacity to observe the person committing the crime? 
In answering this question, you should consider whether the witness' capacity was 
impaired by: 
a) stress or fright at the time of observation; 
b) personal motivations, biases or prejudices; 
c) uncorrected visual defects; 
d) fatigue or injury; 
e) drugs or alcohol. 
You should also consider whether the witness is of a different race than the criminal 
actor. Identification by a person of a different race may be less reliable than identification by a 
person of the same race. 
3. Was the witness sufficiently attentive to the criminal actor at the time of the crime? 
In answering this question, you should consider whether the witness knew that a crime 
was taking place during the time he/she observed the actor. Even if the witness had adequate 
opportunity and capacity to observe the criminal act, he/she may not have done so unless he/she 
was aware that a crime was being committed. 
4. Was the witness' identification of the defendant completely the product of his own 
memory? 
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In answering this question, you should consider: 
a) the length of time that passed between the witness' 
original observation and his identification of the 
defendant; 
b) the witness1 capacity and state of mind at the time 
of the identification; 
c) the witness1 exposure to opinions, descriptions of identifications given by other 
witnesses, to photographs or newspaper accounts, or to any other information or influence 
that may have affected the independence of his/her identification; 
d) any instances when the witness, or any eyewitness to the crime, failed to identify the 
defendant; 
e) any instances when the witness, or any eyewitness to the crime, gave a description of 
the actor that is inconsistent with the defendant's appearance; 
f) the circumstances under which the defendant was presented to the witness for 
identification. 
You may take into account that an identification made by picking the defendant from a 
group of similar individuals is generally more reliable than an identification made from the 
defendant being presented alone to the witness. 
You may also take into account that identifications made from seeing the person are 
generally more reliable than identification made from a photograph. 
I again emphasize that the burden of proving that the defendant is the person who 
committed the crime is on the prosecution. If, after considering the evidence you have heard 
from the prosecution and from the defense, and after evaluating the 
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eyewitness testimony in light of the considerations listed above, you have a reasonable doubt 
about whether the defendant is the person who committed the crime, you must find him not 
guilty. 
